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Introduction 
Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/181 concerning the independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Polish Supreme Court) is the latest in a series of  European Union (EU) 
member states’ requesting the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to rule on the independence of their 
judicial systems. While the organization of justice systems within member states is a competence of 
member states (and so not for the EU to determine or decide), the CJEU has held that member states are 
nevertheless required to comply with obligations under EU law to ensure effective judicial protection, 
and as a necessary corollary, judicial independence. The significance of the current case lies in the 
formulation by the CJEU of a “European” standard of judicial independence, and its finding that national 
judges may set aside the jurisdiction of courts found not to be independent against that standard and to 
disapply any national measure (in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law over national 
law) which gives jurisdiction to a non-independent court.  
Background 
Beginning in 2015, the Polish parliament lead by the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 
government introduced a series of judicial reforms, as part of a larger legislative agenda of constitutional 
and legal reform. Reforms initially targeted the Constitutional Court, followed by the Supreme Court 
and National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ). The practical effect of these reforms was to increase the 
degree of political oversight and control of the judicial system in Poland. The NCJ, the body responsible 
for judicial appointments in Poland, was reformed in a manner which meant that appointments to the 
judiciary are primarily determined by the Parliament and under significant control of the ruling political 
party. These judicial reforms were found to have been both unconstitutional under the Polish constitution 
and, in an earlier judgment of the CJEU, also to have also violated the EU Treaties’ guarantee of judicial 
independence.2 A significant number of judges appointed to the Disciplinary Chamber, which itself was 
introduced through the reforms and responsible for disciplinary actions against Polish judges, were 
appointed by the NCJ, leading to the question and concern of whether the Disciplinary Chamber could 
sufficiently be considered “independent” from political influence. 
In the present case, the CJEU was asked by two Supreme Court judges and a judge of the Supreme 
Administrative Court to consider the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
and where it did not meet EU requirements for judicial independence, whether the referring courts 
should disapply a national law which precluded the referring court from assuming jurisdiction of the 
non-independent court. Advocate General Tanchev, in his Opinion, argued for the Court to rule that the 
Disciplinary Chamber failed to meet the standards required for judicial independence due to the degree 
of influence exerted by the National Council for the Judiciary.  
Judgment of the Court 
In reformulating the questions, the Court first considered the means by which the independence of the 
Disciplinary Chamber could be assessed, taking into account the procedures by which it is appointed, 
and in light of Articles 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 19(1)(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union,3 and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
second question was whether, in cases where the Disciplinary Chamber was found not to guarantee the 
independence of its members (and so unable to guarantee the right to effective judicial protection under 
EU law), the principle of the primacy of EU law requires the referring court to disapply the national law 
which removes its jurisdiction.   
Despite this significant statement on the standard of judicial independence expected of national courts, 
the CJEU did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General, and stopped short of giving a substantive 
assessment of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, instead giving guidance for the 
interpretation and application of the standard by the referring judges. The Court held that Union law 
must be interpreted as precluding the application of EU law falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
court which is not an “independent and impartial tribunal.” Such a determination of whether the court 
is independent must be made based on the objective circumstances in which the court is formed, the way 
and circumstances in which its members are appointed, as well as the features of the court which could 
give rise  
to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court 
to external factors, in particular, as to the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the 
executive and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, may lead to that 
court not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the 
trust which justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.4  
The Court set a series of requirements for courts to be considered independent, consisting of two aspects. 
The first, an external aspect, requires that a court exercise its functions “wholly autonomously” and 
“without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without 
taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever” in order to be protected from any “external 
intervention or pressure” liable to impair or influence their decisions.5 The second, internal, aspect linked 
with impartiality, requires “objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings 
apart from the strict application of the rule of law.”6 Based on this assessment, the CJEU held that a 
national court may find a body not to be a court within the meaning of EU law and should set aside any 
national measure which grants exclusive jurisdiction to a non-independent body to ensure that 
individuals are not deprived of their rights under EU law and the guarantee of effective judicial 
protection under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(1) TEU.7 
Conclusion 
This judgment represents a significant statement on judicial independence within the larger context of 
reforms which have the effect of undermining the autonomy of judges and the separation of powers 
within EU member states. Within Poland, the judgment extends beyond the Disciplinary Court, to 
include any court which could be found to have fallen below the standard of judicial independence, but 
it does not have the automatic effect of invalidating or setting aside any ruling that had been made by 
judges appointed by the NCJ, though it could result in a right of appeal on this basis. In immediate 
response to the judgment, “Act of 20 December 2019 on Amendments to the Act-Law on the System  of  
Ordinary  Courts,  the  Act  on  the  Supreme  Court,  and  Certain Other  Acts” was introduced which 
prohibits Polish courts from questioning the legitimacy of state institutions or the validity of judicial 
appointments, and includes disciplinary procedures against judges who make such assessments. This, in 
effect, is both to counteract and contravene the judgement.   
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